ECOWAS  : E50

A First-Mover Pioneer since 1975. Follower since 2012. Until When?

Sams Dine SY*
26/09/24

E50, label is a symbol and a horizon. Attributive as a symbol of the fiftieth anniversary of the oldest Building Block (B2) on the continent, which has brought together fifteen states of the sub-region since 1975, the date of its creation. Classificatory as a horizon for any future Building BlockBuster (B3, 2050) that the world, Africa and humanity so badly need with the radical change in the strategic landscape when Hegemon - the better to "foment the next reproducible revolution" claims to be "ill-prepared" by playing with the "false positive/true negative" to disorient, punish, decompose, atomize and involve himself in the “civilianization of wars” against enemies and/or “an axe of growing malign partnerships”. The signals issued warn of the use of a new "monelitary" arsenal referring to "Scalpflation" and the "Crypto Belt" to neutralize "them. In particular on the coveted West Atlantic coast of Africa

Here's why.

In the western zone, a single B2 (Ecowas) is home to all the countries, unlike the other zones (north, center, east, south) where at least three intersect. It is undoubtedly this particularity that makes it in turn the First-Mover that never ceases to "wipe the plasters" for the other B2s given a high level of exposure to the Hegelian instinct that makes any regional agreement an enemy. Especially when it has the highest potential to claim the status of B3, even after being relegated to follower status.

The double meaning of the E50 label is certainly a pure coincidence, but easy to understand in the face of so many ruptures that have shaped trajectories and transformation cycles. The experience accumulated since the 1960s is therefore a good source of inspiration in the face of emergencies and so many signals that now warn of a new kind of world war.

Before its creation, many believed that the sub-region that shelters it was all the more blocked because it was not well on its way to being independent. As in all of black Africa, the failure of development sounds like a final sentence.

Despite all these curses, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) was set up on 28 May 1975 as a crowning achievement for the independence of the last country and future member (Cape Verde). It continues for another 2 years to be assimilated to one of the 5 statistical areas of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (Uneca) while being considered an important step in pan-Africanism.
This was all it took to trigger the Hegelian instinct which, outside Africa, transforms any regional agreement into an enemy. A reflex that goes back to distant times when, in Euro-Asian spaces, the ancients attributed "Hic Sunt Leones" to Africa (G. Berger : Phenomenology of Time and Prospective; Puf; 1964).
This attribution is also at the origin of the law popularized by H. Mackinder and N. Spykman according to which "power is inversely proportional to distance". Nazism is the most complete form of this as described in "Barbarian Europe" (K. Love: Perrin, 2014) and "Blood and Ruins" (R. Overy: Viking, 2022).

Thus, the physical drought affecting most of the sub-region is used as a pretext to associate it with the tragedy of the commons, to decree the death of hunters who hinder free access to resources. The Hegelian instinct then invented the financial drought to bring it down on all the member countries in the form of a structural adjustment program, which the majority vigorously applied. In the following decades, the general offensive against poverty (World Bank, 1990) paradoxically resulted in its massive increase. The failure of the development strategy based on the growth rate, the regime and the economic structure is thus acknowledged.

However, Ecowas continues to be a first-mover to the sub-regional blocs of the African Economic Community (Aec) to be created before 2000 in accordance with the Lagos Action Plan (1980). The Abuja Treaty (1991) enshrines this role so that the continent's transformation is effective by 2025 at the latest. Out of the question, say the most absolutists, who did not hesitate at the end of the Cold War to make it disappear from the world map in the most prestigious economic journal (The Economist). The most anxious add a layer by pointing to the threat posed by its demography and that of the rest of the continent to identify it as the carbon sink that the world so badly needs to avoid being asphyxiated.

That's how E50 deserves a thorough look. Its regional skills are immediately put to the test in the face of the ongoing ruptures and of which the radical change in the strategic landscape is only the most mediatized dimension when Hegemon considers itself "ill-prepared" in the face of clever enemies and partners. A world war, the form and contours of which are still unclear, would therefore be inevitable. Can E50, the main theatre, save Africa from falling prey to it and the world from new chaos? According to the posture displayed, E50 is a major player, a stake locked in the status of follower, a remunerative target, becomes moribund at the risk of being zombie as the other B2s around the Sahara have been at one time or another.

The approach advocated breaks with the old intellectual tradition that reduces policy process to a single transformation cycle articulated to a sequential policy cycle. Applied to regional integration, this process begins with the free trade area and ends with political union, including customs union, common market and economic and monetary union. This is due to its inclusion in a "positivist" approach that prohibits any exploratory, constructivist and transformative approach that is essential in the face of the multiplication of uncertainties and ruptures in a world of conflicts, a fragmented humanity, a destabilized Africa. This means more than ever to take a step back, both from the outside and the inside, and to oscillate between the two.

Foreward looking exploration contributes to this by identifying megatrends, wild-cards and outlining several scenarios. Policy analysis is based on this to specify the overall issue, the global players, their game, goals and targets in order to select a limited number of unifying themes of the vision, in this case of a federal ecosystem. The vision makes it possible to oscillate between scenarios and the resulting transformation options through several modalities of articulation of their cycles and the policy process.
This is where the traditional approach is flawed when it simply articulates the policy cycle and a single transformation cycle according to a sequential approach (Garbage Can Organized Anarchy GCOA, Stage Heuristics SH) or a network approach (Multiple Stream Framework MSF, Too Interconnected To Fall, TITF, etc.). Instead of being part of a more appropriate approach to transformation through the cycles integration, which presupposes that the policy cycle is well circumscribed and that the transformation is not reduced to a single cycle given its multiple dimensions: systemic, policy, behaviour, living conditions or impact on regional integration, disparities, etc.

The nature of the disruptions and the magnitude of their effect determine the dynamics of E50, tests the robustness of the single vision for structural and institutional transformation displayed by Ecowas and supposed to cover the period 2007-2020. The 2050 vision available since 09/30/2024 is inscribed, like the previous one, in an ideal scenario or expression of the aspirations of the West African populations.

The western zone is the main one concerned by "Black Africa is off to a bad start" (R. Dumont, Seuil, 1962). A sentence that "strangles" more than one in this post-World War II generation that aspires to peace. The events of 1968 and the explosion of the "free" movement provoked a renewed interest in regional integration - not reducible to pan-Africanism - until a new sentence destabilized more than one. It is as if access to independence was only a chimera and that it was better to remain a colony in a world divided between two blocs. With "West Africa Blocked" (Minuit; 1971), S. Amin issued another sentence that was even more traumatic to the point of inciting more than one to take up the subject. Why reduce such a large region to its political economy when the transformation underway invites a paradigms shift? The "big firms" already aspiring to the status of multinationals are only the visible part. If development results in the transformation of mental and social structures that allow for the participation of all in growth and the spread of these effects, what must be taken into account is the decision-making process of the various economic actors and agents in a given country or region. It is nevertheless true that decision-making analysis was still a taboo (trans)discipline, exclusively reserved for the masters of thought of its dominant current, which gave rise to what was later called the sequential model of public policy analysis inscribed in the positivist paradigm. Nevertheless, in order to counteract balkanization and its harmful effects, all the forms of regional integration advocated so far are part of the stages heuristic, considered to be the royal way of this deep core and model. The Uneca database, a pioneer of regional integration in Africa, is a perfect illustration of this.

If 1975 is the official date of the creation of Ecowas, the idea dates back two decades earlier. It has been making its way since the creation of Uneca in 1958, which at the time had only 9 African member states, plus the countries that still had colonies. Their withdrawal from the 1960s reinforced its role through the "statistical areas" in Africa that it created before replacing them in the early 1970s with the Multinational Interdisciplinary Development Advisory Teams (1969 General Assembly resolution). From 1977-78, Ecowas co-existed with the Operational Centre for Multilateral Programming (Mulpoc) in Niamey, covering 16 West African countries, in addition to four others, the largest of which (Lusaka) covers 18 countries in Southern and Eastern Africa. The other 3 smaller ones concern 7 Central African countries (Yaoundé), 6 North African countries (Tangier) and 3 Great Lakes countries.

But this was without counting on the pervasiveness of the survival reflex and the Hegelian instinct that transforms any "regional u agreement" into an enemy. Except when it is a legacy of the colonial era (Franc Zone, African and Malagasy Union...). This is how support or even incitement to rebellions and other ethno-linguistic-confessional conflicts within or between countries multiplied to block any project of regional agreement likely to deprive the former colonial powers of their hold on resources and their status as members of Uneca. Biafra, Western Sahara and Rwanda are the most insidious examples. Their goal is simple:
- paralyze Nigeria before it polarizes the western zone given its demographic and economic weight; The result: a million deaths and a lost decade for this area;
- invite the future king to a prestigious field by the water to a game of golf, his favorite sport, and offer him a deal: "Prince bruised by the negative use that your dictator makes of the golden age of Spanish painting, you ipso facto withdraw from your possession in exchange for active support to join the European Economic Community; the lure of profit does the rest: an interminable conflict between the neighboring countries of this other "Lost Host" (St Exupéry) which reduces the Uma to a statistical area in a moribund state since its birth in 1989;
- prevent the central zone from getting along and above all from switching to the southern zone, which has become a pole of attraction for all its neighbors thanks to Nelson Mandela; in the process, drastically reduce its population through genocide.

Progressive desertification provides an additional pretext to accentuate the physical drought by the financial drought affecting 45 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 19 of them, more than half of which are in West Africa, are obliged to vigorously implement structural adjustment programs: Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. Only 5 out of 12 manage to carry out a weak adjustment: Benin, Liberia, Sierra Leone, to which are added Burkina Faso and Mali. Attempts to soften the blow multiplied in vain: the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), Panureda, (1986), Carpas (1989)...

The process is ambitious but laborious in the absence of an operational institutional framework and an innovative program. Uneca returned to the attack in 1993 with the "Proposals for a program for the implementation of the Abuja Treaty (E/ECA/CM.19/7)", followed by several capacity-building initiatives resulting from the results of the survey on planning systems in Africa carried out by one of its specialized agencies (Idep, 1992). A survey that puts its finger on the "exquisite pain", namely the weakness or even the absence of capacity in policy analysis. Thus, despite Uneca's warnings not to be part of a process perceived as linear, the latter is content to reproduce the European model based on the stages heuristic combining deepening and enlargement by addition: free trade area-FTA; customs union CU = FTA+; common market CM = CU+; Economic and monetary union EMU = CM+, political union = EMU +. The limitations of this "text book" are visible both in Europe and in Africa. The Draft "Compact for African Recovery" (2001) makes the same observation but does not go further even if it points to other exquisite pains, the partition of the continent by 165 borders dividing 51 countries, the top-down approach, the absence of B2 for trade, regional public goods including peace and security, information and communication technologies... This is due to the weak, chaotic and laborious deployment of policy analysis science throughout the rest of the world, outside the US and especially in Africa

The benchmarking in 2006 of the performance of the main B2s involved in the NEPAD Action Plan focused on internal resources triggered a new dynamic of structural transformation based on regional infrastructures. Instead, a decision to transform the institutions was taken to reduce their number from 10 to 8 in order to limit the number of understudies (West African Economic and Monetary Union/Waemu, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa/Cemac) without affecting the moribund ones (Uma, Igad, Eccas), or discouraging the adhesion of a country to more than one. The pretext put forward is the need to "rationalize the RECs" as recommended by a report to the African Union: Study for the quantification of the scenarios of the rationalization of the Regional Economic Communities (Recs); Idea; 2011

In truth, it is Waemu's performance that provides the real reason. Instead of leveraging its experience to innovate in regional integration, it should have been dissolved into Ecowas. However, feedback from Eca could have triggered a new dynamic that would have made Ecowas a first-mover of another parallel initiative to the AfCFTA around the West, Centre and East zones. The Hegelian instinct spreads unconsciously even among his main targets. It should be remembered that Waemu stems from an initiative by Uneca that has been paving the way for economic and monetary union in Africa since Ecowas in 1991. This once again makes it a first-mover by definition that "wipes the plasters" for other followers when they took up the idea in 1994 to restrict it to only 8 countries.

Rationalization heralds a distribution of roles between two sub-groups, the first (Ecowas, Censad, Eccas) and the economic approach (Comesa, Sadec, Eca). Three B2s covering Southern, Eastern and North-Eastern Africa are taking over by initiating the integration process within the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the AfCFTA (2012) and set up in 2021 for the countries that have ratified the agreement (54 countries except Eritrea). As if to take the hit, Ecowas drags its feet when it brings together the majority (3) of the 5 countries that ratified the agreement only in 2019: Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, Benin.

Since 2006, the traps have multiplied:
- Greed and greed locks member countries into "kakisto/klepto-cracy" through 28 coups d'état since 1990; the "Kaki Belt" intertwines another "Klepto Belt" with devastating and yet tolerated effects;
- Mediocrity and corruption plague the major players drowned in promises from interest groups with a private agenda but whose ultimate goal is to block all B2s;
- The Hegelian instinct paralyzes any regional understanding, reinforces xenophobia, leaving the field open to special forces, terrorist groups and criminal networks to destabilize and weaken the most disadvantaged by creating a climate of violence and terror;
- Fear of the future, an obsession that is tipping the world into a new war.

Almost all the weakened Recs become vulnerable to all kinds of destabilization: attack on Libya to liquidate CenSad, Malian coup to discredit Ecowas in terms of maintaining security, intensification of various conflicts to paralyze Uma, Eccas, Igad, Sadec, Eac, Comesa.

The state of emergency has been ringing since the three dynamic B2s initiating the AfCFTA (Comesa, Sadec, Eac) have been putting pressure on the continental authorities to switch to the customs union from Ecowas and in a short period of time. The latter is coming out of its torpor, relegating to oblivion its internal wanderings between landlocked and exclaved countries, between kakistocrats and kleptocrats, between princes of black gold and policy entrepreneurs.

This new initiative reveals the true nature of Ecowas in this area: a Customs Union (CU) without being one while being one. The difference between Waemu and Zmao is coming to light, forcing the two sub-groups to quickly mitigate them. The Common External Tariff (CET) and the Rules of Origin are instituted throughout the area. The application of the principle of the 4 freedoms is becoming more widespread. The agenda shifts to focus on the links between Ecowas and the neighboring B2s still in a moribund state (Eccas, Uma, Censad). The three dynamic B2s do the same and gradually remove the obstacles to the CU between them, forcing Igad to do the same. There is no longer any question of procrastinating as was the case with the AfCFTA and the hypothesis of a merger is no longer ruled out. Why then be content to be a follower?

To make matters worse, the 50th anniversary of Ecowas is taking place in the context of a world war in search of an analytical framework, if only to know what is at stake and global players involved. Even the main person concerned, given his status as a Hegemon, considers himself "ill-prepared" to the point of commissioning a report (Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States: Final report to Congress; July 2024 www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission) which confirms this sentence before suggesting the mobilization of the non-military to carry it out. This idea is not new because it is perfectly in line with A. Toffler's call for the "civilianization of war" (War and counter-war: surviving at the dawn of the twenty-first century; Fayard; 1994).

The answer was not long in coming, and almost simultaneously with a symposium (The 2024 Economic Policy Symposium. "Reassessing the Effectiveness and Transmission of Monetary Policy," Aug. 22-24) announces "reassessing the effectiveness and transmission of monetary policy".

How did we get here? Why doesn't China break down into 145 states? Why have the African Wars still not atomized this continent? Why is the number of UN members not yet approaching 297? So the digital revolution has been useless? What is the point of fomenting reproducible revolutions?

So nuclear weapons and monetary weapons taken separately are no longer suitable in the face of new threats from the rest of the world? We are more at the end of the Cold War when most of the enemies still standing were easy to identify and fight "with artificial intelligence and virtual reality, we will have to be able to change the reaction of bad guys: for example, make them believe that a door opens on the right when in reality it opens on the left". (C. Childress in A. Tofler op cit).

The tragedy of 9/11 makes it easier to identify the bad guys, but the refusal of key allies to contribute to the Iraq war creates confusion. They are gradually assimilated to malign partners. By way of sanctions, they are constantly being trapped at several doors: Libya, Syria, Sahel, Ukraine, Gaza... The trap is fatal when the issue of energy management shifts to the ocean gateway of Africa, which now stretches from Cape Town to Cape Town via Cape Verde, but no one really knows in which direction it opens. No, if it is controlled, it constitutes the greatest danger for Hegemon, especially since the coastal countries - even more poorly prepared - are the main theater of the world war. "Civilianizing" war may well be the fatal blow that decomposes and disorients all enemies, punishes and atomizes all malign partners.

While these discrepancies can easily be explained by the lack of a sufficiently robust vision to elicit the support of all, neither the report nor the symposium bother to specify the nature of the current rupture. Nevertheless, it is by rereading their respective contributions from a bibliometric review that the processes of "civilianization of war" emerge behind two common threads: reviving an ancestral tradition of "scalping" by putting everything in the hands of "new market makers" version of high-frequency trading. Hegemon is now working to operationalize it by merging defense policy and monetary policy into a "monelitary" policy capable of reducing the rest of the world to a simple freely accessible resource, starting from the ocean gate opposite. Two approaches are emerging:
- "Scalpflation": using inflation to scalp the economy of clever partners and reduce them to simple consumers;
- "Crypto Belt": link all the markets of the enemies around a belt of cryptocurrencies issued from a single country as the lobby in question openly states when it decorates Maga as a "corner", stable on his tie, algo his suit, bit his shoes; using cryptocurrencies to pay off the $35 trillion U.S. national debt; adding $1 trillion every 100 days to fuel a price spike.

These are not electoral campaign promises, much less an illustration of the "false positive" and true negative”, but an attempt to "foment (reproducible) revolutions" (Adam Russell ). All the Road Belts would then only serve to accelerate the speed of traffic.

The hypothesis of a façade that eclipses the Persian Gulf and reconfigures the distribution of oil and gas reserves can no longer be ruled out. Hence all the tribulations that affect its landlocked part and all its ports transformed into service stations for criminal networks of money laundering and trafficking of all kinds: fake durable consumer products for construction, public works, vehicles, equipment, digital technology without forgetting the anarchic export of labor under the guise of the fight against illegal immigration. The downgrading of West Asia to West Africa that results from this hypothesis implies a review of all the global scenarios built to neutralize "An Axis of Growing Malign Partnerships" according to NDS
The last straw for E50 is to find itself brutally reduced to 11 countries - all coastal - when it aims to integrate 54. The break-up of E50 between exclaves and landlocked countries is practically a thing of the past when all the coastal countries give in to the lure of oil and gas to take over the Persian Gulf. Here more than anywhere else, the black gold dresses the partners of the great extractors as the prince of an elitist ethno-linguistic-confessional community that is inaccessible to all those who do not belong to it. A recipe that is all the easier to reproduce on the Atlantic coast as it has worked well in West Asia. This brutal break takes place in general indifference, when the whole world is subjugated by all these classic wars in Eurasia, failing to take an interest in the sudden emergence of a new strategic landscape in which a moribund E50 is going round in circles without a reference point. Waking up will be hard unless